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A PROPOSED REVISION OF SECTION 402A OF
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
James A. Henderson, Jr. t & Aaron D. Twerski 1
I
INTRODUCTION
Only rarely do provisions of the American Law Institute's Re-
statements of the Law rise to the dignity of holy writ. Even more
rarely do individual comments to Restatement sections come to
symbolize important, decisive developments that dominate judicial
thinking. Nevertheless, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts is such a provision. Literally thousands upon thousands of
products liability decisions in the past twenty-five years have explic-
itly referred to, and come to grips with, that section.' Among prod-
ucts liability followers one need only identify an issue as presenting
"a comment k problem," 2 or identify a legislative proposal as "a
comment i provision," 3 to capture instantly the essence of the rele-
vant debate and incorporate nearly thirty years of legal controversy,
development and refinement.
t Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1959, Princeton
University; LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard University.
$ Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1962, Beth Medrash Elyon Re-
search Institute; B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D. 1965, Marquette
University.
1 In a letter to the authors dated October 11, 1991, Marianne M. Walker, A.L.I.
Restatement Case Citations Editor, asserts: "In my nine years with the American Law
Institute I have found § 402A to be the most frequently cited section of any Restate-
ment." After reviewing more than 700 pages of citations in Appendices and pocket
parts, confirmed by a computer-assisted search, we conservatively estimate that no fewer
than 3,000 published court opinions have cited § 402A to the time of this writing.
2 Comment h of the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) limits the
application of strict liability in cases involving "unavoidably unsafe products." For the
most part, comment k has been used by courts to deny claims against drug manufactur-
ers based on defective design. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988);
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
3 Comment i of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) imposes
strict liability only if the product is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." Id. cmt. i. Courts have used this
section to preclude liability in cases involving products whose risks are well known
whether the claims are based on defective design, see, e.g., Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co.,
499 F.2d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1974); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming
Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Wis. 1975); or failure to warn, see, e.g., Seagram & Sons
v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991); Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505, 507
(Vt. 1977).
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Given that section 402A has achieved the status of sacred scrip-
ture, our proposal to replace it with new text and new comments
may strike some readers as blasphemous. What prompts such au-
dacity? Quite simply, doctrinal developments in products liability
have placed such a heavy gloss on the original text of and comments
to section 402A as to render them anachronistic and at odds with
their currently discerned objectives. By changing the relevant lan-
guage to conform to current understandings-by restating the Re-
statement-we hope to clarify much of the confusion that has arisen
over the years.
Only recently, while working on this Article, we learned that the
American Law Institute itself has decided that the products liability
sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, including section 402A,
needs revision. Even more recently, as this article was going to
print, the authors were appointed Reporters for the Products Liabil-
ity provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Given these develop-
ments, we wish to emphasize two points at the outset. First, the
proposals we advance in this Article are solely our own and do not
reflect the views of the American Law Institute. Over the years the
American Law Institute has developed a process of careful delibera-
tion and consultation with a broad group of lawyers, judges, and
academics, before Restatement provisions are presented to the
membership. This Article has not been subjected to such scrutiny.
Second, we have sought to approach the revision of section 402A
cautiously, treating existing language and concepts with considera-
ble respect. Language that has been interpreted by so many courts
over such a substantial period of time cannot be cavalierly dis-
carded. At the same time, issues that once posed burning questions
have now been well settled and new areas of controversy dominate
the landscape. We have thus chosen a moderate approach in draft-
ing our suggested revision. We intend to stay as close as possible to
shared perceptions of the evolved meanings of the original section
and its comments. We do not fancy ourselves as radical reformers,
although we express preferences, based on widely recognized nor-
mative criteria, when choices are appropriate. Finally, we propose
to identify those areas in which true controversy reigns and in which
neither predictions nor recommendations are in order.
Rather than indulge in a lengthy introduction detailing the
background of section 402A's promulgation in 1963 and its subse-
quent history to date,4 we will (as they say) cut to the chase. With
more than a little chutzpah (but not a trace of false modesty), we
4 For useful treatments of the background and subsequent history of § 402A, see
generally William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966);Jay M. Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute:
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offer our proposed revision of section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, together with our "official" comments. Explanations
regarding why it reads the way it does can wait until we get to the
"Authors' Notes" following our suggested revisions. The original
version of section 402A and comments are reproduced in an Appen-
dix to this Article.
II
A REVISED SECTION 402A WITH REVISED COMMENTS
§ 402A. Special Liability of One Who Sells a Defective Product
1 (1) One who sells any product in a defective
2 condition is subject to liability for harm
3 to persons or property proximately caused
4 by the product defect if the seller is engaged
5 in the business of selling such a product.
6
7 (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies in
8 the case of a claim based on a
9
10 (a) manufacturing defect even though the seller
11 exercised all possible care in the preparation
12 and marketing of the product; or
13
14 (b) design defect only if the foreseeable
15 risks of harm presented by the product, when
16 and as marketed, could have been reduced at
17 reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of
18 a safer design; or
19
20 (c) warning defect only if the seller failed to
21 provide reasonable instructions or warnings
22 about nonobvious product-related dangers that
23 were known, or should have been known, to the
24 seller.
Comments:5
a. This section states a special rule of tort liability applicable to
commercial sellers of products. The liability established in this sec-
tion draws on both warranty law and tort law. The provision hold-
ing a seller liable for harm caused by manufacturing defects even
though the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
A Petition for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343 (1965); John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability for
Products: Past, Present and Future, 13 CAP. U. L. REv. 335 (1984).
5 In keeping with the original § 402A and comments, we do not footnote our re-
vised comments. For those who must have footnotes, we supply them in our "Authors'
Notes," infra part III.
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and marketing of the product reflects the heritage of warranty. The
provisions holding sellers liable for design and warning defects re-
flect the influence of tort law's traditional risk-utility balancing. The
liability set forth in this section should not be confused with liability
arising from abnormally dangerous activities, described in sections
519-520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Unlike the strict liability
set forth in those sections, under which defendants may be held lia-
ble even if their activities are socially useful and reasonably con-
ducted, this section requires the plaintiff to establish that the
product that caused the harm was defective in one or more of the
manners prescribed herein.
b. History. As comment g explains in greater detail, manufactur-
ing defects are dangerous departures from a product's intended de-
sign, and typically occur in only a small percentage of units in a
product line. The imposition of liability for defectively manufac-
tured products has a long history in the common law. As early as
1266, special criminal statutes were enacted in England imposing
liability upon victualers, vintners, brewers, butchers, cooks, and
other persons who supplied contaminated food or drink. In the
early 1960s, American courts came to recognize that a seller of any
product containing a manufacturing defect should be liable in tort
for harm caused by the defect regardless of the plaintiff's ability to
maintain a traditional negligence or warranty action. Liability would
attach even if the manufacturer's quality control in producing the
defective product was not negligent. Furthermore, the plaintiff
need not be in direct privity with the defendant seller to bring an
action. This cause of action for defectively manufactured products,
recognized by American courts since the early 1960s, is a hybrid. It
merges the no-negligence aspects of implied warranty with the no-
privity aspects of tort.
Design and warning defects occur when the intended designs
and/or modes of marketing are unreasonably dangerous; if the de-
sign or marketing of a product is defective, every unit in the product
line is defective. See comment h. Liability for design and warning
defects was a relatively rare phenomenon until the late 1960s and
early 1970s. A host of limited-duty rules made recovery for such
defects, especially design defects, difficult to obtain. Following the
erosion of these rules, courts sought to apply the rule of tort liability
without fault to design and warning defect cases. Although numer-
ous courts, accepting the invitation of section 402A, held that the
doctrine of strict liability applied with equal force to all types of
product defects, it soon became evident that the rule created to deal
with liability for manufacturing defects could not, without consider-
able difficulty, be applied to design and warning defect cases. With
1992] 1515
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respect to manufacturing defects, no conceptual problems arise in
identifying product defects. A product unit that fails to meet the
manufacturer's own quality standard and thereby fails to perform its
intended function is, almost by definition, defective. With regard to
design and warning defects, however, the product unit meets the
manufacturer's own standard of product quality; therefore, it is nec-
essary to go outside the product unit itself to define "defect."
Subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) reflect the view adopted by most
courts that the rule developed for manufacturing defects is inappro-
priate for the resolution of design and warning defect cases. The
governing standard of liability for design and warning defects re-
quires a determination that a product's reasonably fdreseeable risks
outweigh its social utility. Although the phraseology of the tests for
liability differs, at their core, subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) both rely
on traditional risk-utility balancing.
c. Policy justifications. The rule set forth in this section estab-
lishes different standards of liability for manufacturing defects and
design and warning defects. Policyjustifications that support a strict
liability rule with respect to manufacturing defects do not support
application of the same rule to design and warning defects. In the
case of manufacturing defects, courts have supported the rule im-
posing strict liability because it enhances social utility by satisfying
four major objectives. Strict liability encourages manufacturer in-
vestment in product safety; discourages the consumption of defec-
tive products by causing the purchase prices of products to reflect
the cost of defects; reduces the transaction costs involved in litigat-
ing manufacturer fault; and promotes risk spreading by ensuring
that the full brunt of a product-related injury does not fall on the
victim alone.
Several important fairness concerns also support strict liability
for manufacturing defects. Consumers injured by flawed products
argue that their fundamental expectations as to product perform-
ance have been disappointed. Their dissatisfaction is heightened
because manufacturers invest in quality control at consciously cho-
sen levels. The manufacturer's very knowledge that a predictable
number of flawed products will enter the marketplace and cause in-
jury lends to the harm an element of deliberate infliction. Finally, it
seems only just that consumers who benefit from products should
share, through increases in the prices charged for those products,
the burden of unavoidable injury costs that result from undetectable
manufacturing defects.
In contrast to manufacturing defects, design and warning de-
fects require more flexible definitions. In the first place, one cannot
determine mechanically whether the design or marketing of a prod-
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uct is defective; some sort of risk-utility balancing is necessary.
Products are not defective merely because their designs are danger-
ous. Users of such products must bear a substantial portion of the
responsibility for managing generic product risks. Imposing the un-
yielding liability rule established for manufacturing defects on de-
sign risks would cause more careful product users to subsidize less
careful users, a result that would be both inefficient and unfair. For
many inherent product risks, therefore, users are the best risk mini-
mizers. Risk-utility balancing is required to determine which risks
are more fairly and efficiently borne by product sellers, and thus by
users generally, and which should be borne by individual by product
users who suffer injury.
Moreover, for the liability system to be fair and efficient, risk-
utility balancing must be accomplished in light of the knowledge of
risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably available at the time
of distribution. Application of a rule holding manufacturers liable
for risks that were not foreseeable when the product was marketed
might arguably foster increased manufacturer investment in safety.
However, insurers cannot provide coverage for unforeseeable or in-
determinable risks. Furthermore, to impose liability for unforesee-
able and hence incalculable risks would violate a manufacturer's
right to be held to a liability standard that it is capable of meeting.
For these reasons, subsection (2)(b) applies risk-utility balancing to
the product "when and as marketed," and subsection (2)(c) holds
sellers liable for failing to warn of nonobvious risks "that were
known, or should have been known, to the seller."
d. One who sells any product. The rule stated in this section ap-
plies only to those who distribute products in commercial markets.
It does not impose strict liability on those who primarily distribute
services even if, while performing their services, they cause damage
through the use of defective products. For example, hospitals and
physicians are not held strictly liable when defective instruments
they have used to perform medical procedures cause injury. Often a
commercial provider of services uses a product ancillary to the per-
formance of a service, in a manner analogous to a sale. Thus, a
product repairer may use a replacement part ancillary to the repair
service, or a beauty parlor may provide a hair treatment product
while performing the services of a beautician. Many courts have ap-
plied the rule of this section to cover such product-related transac-
tions. Others have drawn a sharp distinction between sale and
service, applying strict products liability only to the former and leav-
ing the latter to be governed by the rules of negligence.
The rule stated in this section is not limited to traditional com-
mercial sales of products. Other forms of mass-marketing are suffi-
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ciently sale-like that courts have treated them as the functional
equivalent of product sales. Commercial lessors of products for
consumer use are thus liable for injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts that they lease to consumers. Courts have also extended the
rule of this section to include mass-produced housing marketed by
developers, although sales of real property were not historically
within the ambit of product sales. When courts find that the policy
justifications set forth in Comment c are fully applicable to the en-
terprise in question, they tend to impose the rule stated in this sec-
tion with little regard to the formal structure of the underlying
transaction. By and large, the rule stated in this section leaves such
decisions to the developing case law.
e. Alternative liability. For the most part, traditional principles of
causation govern products liability litigation under the rule stated in
this section. See comment 1. Thus, it is the plaintiff's burden in
most cases to establish that a given product unit sold by a manufac-
turer or other seller caused or enhanced his injury. Notwithstand-
ing this general rule, this section is not intended to limit the
developing case law imposing alternative liability on manufacturers
in special circumstances. A significant number of courts have ap-
plied various forms of alternative liability to drug manufacturers, al-
most exclusively in cases involving DES, even though no specific
product unit can be shown to be directly responsible for the plain-
tiff's injury. The long latency period between exposure and mani-
fest injury in such cases, coupled with the generic nature of the
medication and the lack of recordkeeping necessary for defendant
identification, has led some courts to set aside the traditional rules
regarding causation. Other courts have failed to follow this lead.
The rule stated in this section sets forth the traditional causation
rule as the governing standard. This comment recognizes that di-
gressions from the rule may be called for in unusual circumstances.
However, when defendant identification is possible, courts should
be reluctant to abandon traditional causation principles. For this
reason, even courts that have embraced alternative liability in latent
drug injury cases have not done so in asbestos injury cases.
f Business of selling such a product. The rule stated in this section
applies to anyone in the business of selling the type of product that
injured the plaintiff. The seller's business need not be limited to the
sale of such products. However, the rule does not cover occasional
sales outside the regular course of business (frequently referred to
as "casual sales"). Thus, a manufacturer who occasionally sells sur-
plus or used equipment does not fall within the ambit of this rule.
Traditionally, intermediaries such as wholesalers, retailers and
distributors have been held strictly liable as sellers. Their status
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under current law is less certain. Some courts continue to treat
them as sellers within the scope of this section. However, a substan-
tial number of states have enacted legislation absolving non-manu-
facturer sellers of strict liability if the manufacturer is subject to the
jurisdiction of the court and is capable of paying a potential judg-
ment. Other states have reached similar results through judicial in-
terpretation of the strict liability doctrine. The rule in this section
leaves such issues to developing case law and statutes.
The rule stated in this section applies primarily to sellers of new
products. The liability of commercial sellers of used products has
been widely debated in the courts. Every court agrees that such sell-
ers are liable for their negligence, but whether they may be held
strictly liable is disputed. A majority of courts take the position that
imposing strict liability on commercial sellers of used products does
not further the policies expressed in comment c. On this view, used
product markets are open to such variation that consumers are bet-
ter served by freeing the market of the strictures of strict liability. A
minority of courts have held that imposing strict liability pressures
such sellers to improve inspection of used goods before placing
them on the market, thus enhancing the safety of such consumer
goods. The rule stated in this section takes no position on this is-
sue, leaving its resolution to developing case law.
g. Manufacturing defects. A product is defective under subsection
(2) (a) if it fails to meet the manufacturer's internal quality standards.
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that such a defect exis-
ted in the product when it left the hands of the defendant-seller. It
is disputed whether the plaintiff must establish the specific defect
that caused the harm. Some courts have held that reasonable infer-
ences may support a finding of liability under subsection (2)(a).
Whether a given factual record supports such an inference is an is-
sue for the court to decide as a matter of law in the first instance. In
cases in which reasonable persons could differ, the issue is for the
trier of fact.
Courts have struggled with the application of this standard in
cases involving foodstuffs. Some have created a "foreign-natural"
distinction, holding that foreign matter constitutes a defect whereas
parts of the foodstuff that are natural to it, even if hazardous, do
not. Thus, a fish bone in fish chowder has been held to be natural,
whereas a chicken bone in a chicken sandwich has been held to be
foreign matter. Courts have increasingly rejected this distinction,
opting instead for a consumer-expectation test under which a food-
stuff is defective if it contains matter not expected by a reasonable
consumer. Although the consumer-expectation test has been widely
criticized when applied in generic defect cases (see comment h), it
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seems peculiarly adapted to cases involving manufacturing defects
in foodstuffs.
h. Design defects. Courts have created several different tests to
establish liability for design defects. A majority of courts use some
version of a risk-utility balancing test, either by directly adopting a
negligence approach or by adopting some version of the approach
set forth in this section. Liability attaches only when the plaintiff
proves that the defendant failed to adopt a safer, cost-effective de-
sign that would have prevented all or part of the plaintiff's harm. A
significant number of courts, however, make recovery dependent on
whether the product design fails to meet reasonable consumer ex-
pectations. Most of these courts also consider the availability of a
reasonable-cost, safer alternative design in deciding whether the de-
fendant's design is acceptable. Admittedly, the formal structure of
the liability standard differs somewhat from one court to another.
Whether the risk-utility balancing is based on the view of the reason-
able consumer or the reasonable product seller is a detail left to the
various jurisdictions.
The requirement in subsection (2)(b) that the plaintiff demon-
strates that a safer design could have been adopted at reasonable
cost introduces an important element of materiality. The alternative
design must be sufficiently safer than the actual design to have pre-
vented or substantially reduced the harm for which the plaintiff
seeks recovery. See comment 1. Thus, in almost every case, the
plaintiff must do more than merely show that the defendant's design
could have been made "just a little safer."
At bottom, the "reasonable-cost, safer design" approach dis-
cussed in this section is that taken by a majority of American courts.
A few courts have adopted idiosyncratic tests for design defect. For
example, one state court applies a standard whereby the manufac-
turer is made the "guarantor" of the product's safety. Another ap-
pears to apply a consumer-expectation test that has no risk-utility
component. These opinions are not consistent with the rule stated
in this section.
i. Categorical design liability not recognized. By referring explicitly
to risk reduction through the adoption of a reasonable-cost, safer
design, subsection (2)(b) makes clear that the social risk-utility bal-
ancing employed in judging the reasonableness of product designs
will not be undertaken on a categorical basis. For the purposes of
this analysis, product categories are relatively broad subsets of
products for which, given their inherent design characteristics, no
adequate alternatives are available. Examples include alcoholic bev-
erages, tobacco products, handguns, and above-ground swimming
pools. With respect to a product in such a category, plaintiffs are
1520 [Vol. 77:1512
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unable to prove the availability of a safer design that does not elimi-
nate the inherent characteristic that renders the product and other
similar products attractive in the marketplace. For example, remov-
ing the alcohol from an alcoholic beverage not only removes the
product from the category of alcoholic beverages, but also renders it
unattractive to most consumers of alcoholic beverages. Alcohol-
free "alcoholic beverages" are not, therefore, available to most con-
sumers at "reasonable cost." A plaintiff could attack such a product
for its alcoholic quality only by attacking the larger category of alco-
holic beverages as somehow per se unreasonably dangerous, some-
thing that subsection (2)(b) disallows.
Although courts in a few jurisdictions have purportedly allowed
plaintiffs to condemn broad product categories as unreasonably
dangerous, those decisions have been overturned by statute. Virtu-
ally every American jurisdiction now rejects product category liabil-
ity. The inherent risks associated with product categories are
typically open and obvious, and can be adequately managed in the
marketplace. Moreover, the legal and factual issues raised in cate-
gorical product design litigation are beyond the capacities of courts
to resolve. Decisions regarding which product categories should
generally be available to users and consumers are best left to the
marketplace or, in rare instances, to government regulators other
than courts.
Of course, when a plaintiff can establish that a manufacturing
defect caused injury; that a product unit could have been designed
more safely without eliminating the inherent characteristics that
both define it categorically and make it desirable for use and con-
sumption; or that a product unit could have been distributed with
more adequate and useful instructions and warnings, then the rule
stated in this section supports liability. Butjudicial attacks on prod-
uct categories, as such, are not recognized.
j. Warning defects. Subsection (2)(c) embraces a rule of liability
long recognized by American courts: product sellers have a duty to
provide reasonable instructions or warnings about nonobvious risks
of injury associated with their products whenever a reasonable per-
son in the seller's position would have, or reasonably should have,
known of such risks of injury and could have supplied instructions
or warnings to someone in a position to act effectively on such infor-
mation. In most cases, the duty is based on the seller's knowledge at
the time of sale, but under special circumstances post-sale duties to
warn, based on later-acquired knowledge, may arise.
In any event, risks that should be obvious to reasonable persons
need not be instructed about or warned against. In determining
whether a risk is sufficiently obvious not to require a warning,
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judges have an important initial role to play in screening cases and
keeping clear cases from the jury. It is anticipated, however, that
obviousness of risk will be assessed by the jury in all cases in which
reasonable minds might differ.
Product warnings help to reduce risks when supplied to persons
in positions to act effectively on that information. Thus, the persons
to whom product warnings should be given typically include users
and consumers, but also include anyone who a reasonable distribu-
tor should know is in a position to respond to the instruction or
warning by reducing or eliminating the risk of injury. The require-
ment in subsection 402A(1) that the defective condition be shown to
have "proximately caused" the harm to persons or property im-
poses on plaintiffs in warning cases the burden of proving that, if an
adequate instruction or warning had been supplied, use and con-
sumption would have been altered so as to reduce or eliminate the
plaintiff's injury.
k. Prescription drugs (first alternative). Subject to the limitation
recognized in comment i, courts may legitimately entertain causes of
action based on most claims of defective product design. Notwith-
standing this general rule, the overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions have taken the position that a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the prescribing physician regarding the design
of a prescription drug. As long as the drug is marketed with warn-
ings that adequately inform the prescribing physician of the drug's
foreseeable dangers, the manufacturer is not held to the risk-utility
standard set forth in subsection (2)(b). The position stated in this
Comment applies to all prescription drugs as a matter of law, requir-
ing no case-by-case examination of the risks and benefits of individ-
ual prescription drugs that are the subject of litigation.
k. Prescription drugs (second alternative). Subject to the limitation
recognized in comment i, courts may legitimately entertain causes of
action based on claims of inadequate design utilizing normal risk-
utility standards. Notwithstanding this general rule, a majority of
American jurisdictions recognize that special problems attend de-
sign defect litigation with respect to prescription drugs. Different
drugs provide benefits to various subgroups of patients. It is nor-
mally the decision of the prescribing physician, who has received
adequate warnings of the drug's benefits and detriments, whether or
not to prescribe the drug. Thus, the only basis on which courts tra-
ditionally have held drug manufacturers liable is unreasonable fail-
ure to warn of known or knowable risks.
On occasion, however, drug designs are attacked as unsound
on the ground that the harms they cause outweigh their overall ben-
efit to society. A majority of courts have taken the position that
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drug design litigation is unwise, and that a drug manufacturer has a
duty only to warn prescribing physicians of foreseeable risks. Other
courts allow design defect cases against the manufacturer of a pre-
scription drug, but only after the trial court has made an initial de-
termination that the risk-utility design standard may have been
needlessly violated. Even courts that allow design defect litigation
involving prescription drugs recognize that risk-utility balancing can
only be accomplished based on the knowledge that was or should
reasonably have been available to the drug manufacturer. Thus,
when a court declares that a prescription drug is not subject to a
design defect action it has for all practical purposes eliminated ac-
tions based on both negligence and strict liability. Of course, a drug
manufacturer can always be held liable for failing to warn about
risks associated with ingestion of the drug, pursuant to commentj.
L. Proximate causation. As subsection 402A(1) makes clear, the
product defect must have proximately caused the plaintiff's harm
for liability to be imposed under the rule stated in this section.
Courts differ widely in their analysis of causation in products liabil-
ity cases. Previous comments dealing with other provisions have re-
ferred to the causation issue. Regardless of the relevant
terminology, causation presents four discrete factual issues in this
context. Not every case involves all four; many cases are problem-
atic with respect only to one or at most two such issues. And some
courts merge these discrete causation issues under broader head-
ings that tend to obscure the differences. But close analysis of deci-
sions from many different jurisdictions suggests that, beneath the
differing and often confusing rhetoric, products liability litigation
presents these four basic factual issues.
First, the tribunal must determine whether the product unit (or,
in the case of alternative liability, a product unit in the product
line-see comment e) was a but-for cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
harm. Second, the tribunal must determine (subject to the alterna-
tive liability exception discussed in comment e) whether the defen-
dant commercially distributed the product unit. Third, the tribunal
must determine whether the defective condition of the product unit
was a but-for cause of the plaintiff's harm. And fourth, the court
must determine whether the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff
was among the types of harm reasonably foreseeable when the de-
fendant distributed the defective product unit. In most cases courts
place on the plaintiff the burden of proof regarding causation.
In connection with the third causation issue-whether the de-
fective condition of the product was a but-for cause of the plaintiff's
harm-the plaintiff bears three different burdens of proof, depend-
ing on the type of defect involved. In cases involving manufacturing
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defects, the plaintiff must prove that the same harm would not have
occurred had the product unit not contained the defect. In cases
involving design defects, the plaintiff must prove that the same harm
would not have occurred had the defendant adopted the safer de-
sign suggested by the plaintiff. And in cases involving warning de-
fects, the plaintiff must prove that the same harm would not have
occurred had the defendant provided adequate instructions or
warnings.
Again, courts employ different terminology to describe these
causation issues. Some courts refer to the first and second issues,
taken together, as "cause-in-fact" and to the third and fourth, taken
together, as "proximate causation." Other courts refer to the first
and third issues, taken together, as "cause-in-fact"; the second issue
as "defendant identification"; and the fourth issue, taken alone, as
"proximate cause." And some lump all four questions together
under broad umbrella terms such as "substantial factor," "legal
cause," "superceding or intervening cause," or "proximate causa-
tion." The rule stated in this section leaves the nuances of causation
terminology to the developing case law. Nevertheless, enhanced
clarity would result if courts utilized the functional definitions set
forth in this comment.
m. Warranty. Most jurisdictions apply the rule stated in this sec-
tion under the rubric of tort. Admittedly, the same liability rules
could emanate from the action for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code. Numerous
courts have held that the rule stated in this section and implied war-
ranty of merchantability are virtually identical. Factors collateral to
the basic liability rule in this section support the preference for the
tort characterization over that of implied warranty. For example, if
the warranty framework were utilized, defendants would contend
that the U.C.C. statute of limitations, which runs from the time of
sale, should govern, rather than the tort statute of limitations, which
runs from the time of injury. Or it could be argued that privity limi-
tations, which still retain considerable vigor under traditional con-
tract law, should define the eligibility of parties to suit.
Furthermore, courts might be more likely to recognize disclaimers
or other contract-based limitations on recovery if the action were
contract-based rather than rooted in tort law. Placing the rule
stated in this section firmly within tort doctrine permits courts to
sidestep these issues.
Nonetheless, several jurisdictions have insisted that products li-
ability cases based on the rule stated in this section be prosecuted
under the Uniform Commercial Code. For the most part, they have
utilized creative statutory interpretations to reach results closely
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analogous to those reached by courts utilizing the implied warranty
doctrine. Occasionally, decisions utilize "implied warranty strict lia-
bility" for product-related personal injury, reflecting the influence
of contract doctrine. These nuances tend to be of minor impor-
tance. Courts generally have cut through to the bone to determine
the essence of the cause of action. Even if the Uniform Commercial
Code provides the label for the cause of action, tort doctrine defines
the relevant issues for decision.
n. Contributory fault. The application of the contributory fault
doctrine to products liability claims raises both serious policy issues
and difficult questions of implementation. At the policy level, it has
been argued that reducing the plaintiff's recovery by the percentage
of his fault compromises the policy decision to impose primary re-
sponsibility for such injuries on manufacturers to encourage them
to produce safer products. At the level of practical implementation,
courts have noted that comparing the fault of the plaintiff to a defect
in the product is no easy task. This is especially true with regard to
manufacturing defect cases in which no form of risk-utility balancing
is utilized in establishing the defect. Notwithstanding these argu-
ments, a majority of courts use comparative fault to reduce the re-
covery of a products liability plaintiff whose negligence has
contributed to his injury. In cases involving design and warning de-
fects, the issue takes on an added dimension because the defect is
often the manufacturer's failure to account for foreseeable (albeit
arguably unreasonable) conduct on the part of the plaintiff. Thus,
some courts hesitate to find plaintiffs contributorily at fault in de-
sign and warning defect cases. On the other hand, relieving con-
sumers of all responsibility for safe product use defeats the
objectives of products liability and runs against the grain of com-
mon sense. See comment c. The rule stated in this section accepts
the majority view, allowing comparative fault to operate as a partial
or total defense to a products liability claim depending on the gen-
eral comparative fault rules in a given jurisdiction. This section
takes no position on whether some forms of comparative fault
should not be allowed as a defense or even partial mitigation; nor
does it resolve the issue of whether assumption of the risk should
operate as a total bar in some instances. This section leaves these
issues for the developing case law.
o. Misuse, alteration, and modification. Occasionally a product is
subject to post-sale misuse, alteration, or modification. When third
persons engage in such conduct, its effects will be determined under
the rules of proximate cause that govern products liability cases. See
comment 1. When plaintiffs engage in such conduct, its effects will
ordinarily be determined by the rules of comparative fault set forth
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herein. See comment n. Occasionally a plaintiff's misconduct is so
eggregious that it constitutes an intervening cause, eliminating the
defendant's liability altogether.
p. Pure economic loss. The rule stated in this section applies only
to products that cause harm to persons or property. If the plaintiff
suffers only economic loss (e.g., loss of profits, costs of repair or
replacement of the defective product), recovery is governed by the
rules of the Uniform Commercial Code. The line of demarcation
between physical damage to property and pure economic loss is not
easy to draw. The courts appear intent on distinguishing between
tort and contract, based on the nature of damages suffered. In do-
ing so they generally pay little attention to whether the defective
product had the inherent potential to cause serious physical harm to
persons or property. This section leaves these issues for the devel-
oping case law.
III
AUTHOR'S NOTES
A. General Observations
If the truth be known, section 402A as originally drafted was
not really a restatement of existing law.6 Products liability was in its
infancy in 1963 when the American Law Institute (ALI) promul-
gated this most important provision. No one, for example, could
have foreseen that language written primarily to govern manufac-
turing defect cases7 might be used by courts in design and warning
defect cases. The common law rules governing design and warning
defect litigation were still heavily mired in the limited-duty setting of
the previous half-century.8 Nor could anyone have foreseen the dif-
6 Smyser, supra note 4, at 344. But see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964).
7 See PROSSER, supra note 6, § 96. Almost contemporaneously with the writing of
the Restatement, Prosser acknowledges that strict liability has had little impact on product
liability claims based on defective design or failure to warn. Prosser predicts that these
claims, unlike claims based on manufacturing defect, will continue to be grounded in
negligence. It is clear from reading the treatise sections dealing with product liability
that Prosser envisaged § 402A as having its primary effect on cases of manufacturing
defects. George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2301 (1989).
8 See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.) (no duty to
design accident-proof vehicles), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), overruled by Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.,
377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (manufacturer's liability goes only to product's intended
use), modified by Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978) (liability
attaches when plaintiff is injured while foreseeably misusing a product); Campo v.
Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950) (no duty to design against open and obvious dan-
gers), overruled by Micallefv. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976). When § 402A was
written, contributory negligence was still a total bar to recovery in most jurisdictions.
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ficult causation problems that would arise with regard to defendant
identification.9 The list of unresolved issues could go on and on.' 0
In any event, as a prestatement, section 402A served as a marvelous
catalyst to change. It shook American courts out of their doldrums
and invited them to re-examine many premises that stood as impedi-
ments to plaintiff recovery. "Strict liability" became more than a
legal doctrine. It was the clarion call for a liability system free of
artificial and often wooden restraints on liability. Faced with sub-
stantial authority to the contrary, plaintiffs could point to section
Though the comments limited the role of contributory negligence in products liability
cases, it and its twin, assumption of the risk, played an important role in limiting liability
for generic defects. Since then, of course, comparative fault has been enacted in 45
jurisdictions. For the most part, contributory negligence has thus departed from the
scene as a total bar to recovery. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
§ 1.1 (2d ed. 1986).
9 See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
10 The following is a partial list of issues that were either unresolved or totally un-
foreseen when § 402A was drafted:
(1) Liability to the indeterminate plaintiff or liability based on pro-
portional causation. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F.
Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d
474 (Wash. 1983);
(2) Liability for lessors, commercial builders, franchisors, etc. See,
e.g., Harris v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024 (W.D. Va. 1982);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (N.J.
1965); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965);
(3) The problems of damage assessment arising from second-colli-
sion liability, whether against defendant in crashworthiness cases or
against plaintiff in failing to use seat belts. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537
F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Waterson v. General Motors Corp., 544 A.2d
357 (NJ. 1988);
(4) Liability in cases involving sale of used products. See, e.g., Cran-
dell v. Larkin and Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31 (S.D. 1983);
(5) The difficulty in drawing a line between sales and service. See,
e.g., Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985);
Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967), aff'd
sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969);
(6) The difficulties of working out the relationship between com-
parative fault and strict tort liability. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse,
610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979);
(7) The problems related to recognizing a cause of action for
mental distress arising from products related injuries. See, e.g., Payton v.
Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982); Kennedy v. McKesson Co.,
448 N.E.2d 1332 (N.Y. 1983);
(8) The difficulties in deciding which forms of product related eco-
nomic loss were to be covered by products liability law and which were to
be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986);
(9) Whether there is a duty to warn of scientifically unknowable or
unforeseeable risks. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning, 810 P.2d 549
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402A and argue with relative impunity that the old rules governed
only the universe of negligence. Strict liability was different.'"
A quarter century has passed. The pace of American products
liability litigation has been fast and furious. We can say with some
confidence that if we have not yet seen all the problems raised in
such litigation, we have seen most of them. It is also fair to say that
although courts continue to differ on many issues, enormous con-
sensus has evolved regarding fundamental questions. This consen-
sus requires further description and elaboration. First, on many
issues there is simply broad-based, flat-out agreement as to doc-
trine. 12 Second, in those instances in which courts differ with re-
spect to doctrine, careful analysis reveals that despite the somewhat
different verbalizations, the core approaches to the underlying
problems are remarkably similar.' 3 Third, even where underlying
differences can be substantiated, the practical implications for liti-
gants often turn out to be smaller than they seem at first. 14 Finally,
we believe that some of the disagreement is the product of a frag-
mented approach to the subject matter. In the absence of a thor-
ough and easily articulated alternate standard, courts often opt to
(Cal. 1991); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (NJ.
1982);
(10) A product manufacturer's duty to provide an informed choice
warning even when the warning would not reduce risk. See, e.g., Finn v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1984);
(11) The complex interaction between design defect and failure to
warn. See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978);
(12) Whether liability will attach even if manufacturer met state-of-
the-art standards extant at the time of manufacture. See, e.g., Boatland of
Houston v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980);
(13) Whether a manufacturer has a duty to install safety devices
rather than provide such devices as options to the purchaser. See, e.g.,
Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984);
(14) Liability of successor corporations for product related harms
caused by their predecessors. See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d
368 (Wash. 1984).
11 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (altering burden of
proof as to risk-utility balancing on grounds of strict liability); Prutch v. Ford Motor Co.,
618 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1980) (requiring each member of the distributive chain to prove
that the product was not defective when it left its hands in order to effectuate the poli-
cies behind strict liability); Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971) (altering traditional causation rules on grounds of strict liability), rev'd, 480
S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
12 There is, for example, virtually no disagreement that:
(1) strict liability sans risk-utility is the governing standard for man-
ufacturing defect cases;
(2) strict liability does not apply to pure services or to cases in
which the service function predominates;
(3) strict liability applies to commercial lessors, sellers of new
homes, franchisors, etc.
13 See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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go their own way, carving out a separate niche for themselves. 15 In
short, the time is ripe for a true restatement of products liability law.
We make no bones about it. We have drafted our proposed
revision of section 402A to reflect a broad consensus view. When
faced with a choice of drafting language in either the black letter
text or the comments that introduces nuanced conflict or reflects
consensus, we have opted for the latter. If courts in the future wish
to debate the niceties and fine points, that is their prerogative. This
proposed revision of section 402A, were it eventually to be adopted,
would not stand in their way. But we hope the courts will also come
to realize that beyond the minor points of disagreement stands a
rather imposing doctrinal structure to which almost all pay
allegiance.
In drafting our proposed revision, we face a logistical problem
of considerable magnitude. Over the past decade thirty-eight state
legislatures have passed statutes dealing with product liability law as
part of their tort reform proposals. 16 Had we sought to account for
all the differences among states, it would have been impossible to
draft a restatement. However, by dealing with broad consensus
principles, it is possible to embrace a basic structure without run-
ning afoul of the state statutes. For the most part, products liability
reform statutes do not stake out new principles of law; rather, they
constitute adaptations of fundamental principles, each setting forth
its own nuances. Thus, most reform statutes fit nicely into our re-
vised black letter restatement of existing law. t 7
Products liability mavens will note that we have not dealt with
or commented upon every controversial issue in products liability
15 Cases such as Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978), and Camp-
bell v. General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982), came about, in our opinion,
because the Restatement had failed to update its definition of defect to reflect the broad
consensus that exists among the states. In the absence of a broadly stated consensus
view, courts have tended toward idiosyncratic and extremist positions.
16 The statutes are collected in the Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) vol. 2.
17 For example, statutes requiring a technologically feasible alternative as a predi-
cate to design-based liability are fully consistent with our proposed Restatement. See, e.g.,
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West 1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 58C-3.a.(1) (West 1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F) (Anderson 1991). Other statutes present slightly
different nuances, but fall well within the tenor of the revision. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-683(1) (1992) (authorizing affirmative defense upon proof that product plans,
manufacturing methods, inspection, testing, and labelling conformed with state of the
art); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Baldwin 1991) (authorizing presumption of no
defect upon proof of manufacturer's adherence to state of the art in design, manufactur-
ing methods, and testing); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(1) (West Supp. 1992) (al-
lows trier of fact to consider evidence-of-industry custom, technological feasibility, or
compliance with nongovernmental or legislative regulatory standards).
Similarly, statutes dealing with such issues as product misuse, modification and al-
teration fall within the general framework of comment o of our proposed Restatement.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 6-1405(4) (1990); IND.
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law. We acknowledge that we have omitted many issues from our
discussion.' 8 To do otherwise would require that we abandon our
effort to write a restatement and instead author a treatise on the law
of products liability. On the other hand, we have taken firm posi-
tions on a number of central issues, especially when the comments
are taken into account. 19 By definition, a restatement challenges the
writer to outline the widely accepted principles that govern an area
of the law. Others working from our proposal may challenge the
wisdom of any given omission. Such debate is welcome, with the
proviso that the sum of suggested additions not undo the effort to
restate the law in a manner that is both useful to and useable by the
bench and bar. It would be helpful to bear in mind that if efforts to
revise section 402A fail, the alternative is the retention of an out-
dated and misleading section 402A-one that might have been a
work of art in the era of violent change that followed its adoption,
but which is today incapable of reflecting the reality of literally
thousands upon thousands of decided cases.
B. Specific Problems
1. Negligence vs. Strict Liability
The reader will search the proposed black letter and comments
in vain to find explicit language outlining whether design and warn-
ing defects are governed by strict liability. We have taken no ex-
plicit position on this issue because it seems to us that the debate is
CODE § 33-1-1.5-4 (1982). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-719 (1991); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.1-04 (1991).
Many of the subjects of statutory tort reform are not touched upon in our proposed
Restatement and its comments. Thus, subjects such as statutes of repose, punitive dam-
ages, joint and several liability, caps on damages for pain and suffering, and worker's
compensation, which have been the subject of considerable legislative attention, are not
discussed in the proposed revision of the Restatement.
18 For example, we have not dealt with such questions as: (1) who has the burden
of proving enhanced damages in second-collision litigation; (2) whether the manufac-
turer has a duty to install safety features or can shift the duty to purchasers by providing
optional equipment; (3) whether disclaimers can play any role in precluding liability in
cases in which plaintiffs have suffered personal injury; or (4) whether compliance with
statutory standards or industry custom is a defense to a claim based on design defect or
failure to warn.
19 The most significant position we have taken, of course, relates to the legal stan-
dards for determining product defectiveness. Subsections (2)(a), (b) and (c) set forth
the relevant substantive provisions for the three basic types of defect. In addition, we
opt for a time-of-distribution perspective regarding knowledge of risks and risk avoid-
ance, and reject consumer-expectation as an independently sufficient test for generic
defect. We also explicitly reject product category liability and spell out the substance, if
not the superficial rhetoric, of causation. Our first alternative version of comment k,
which we prefer, explicitly precludes design review of prescription drugs. Further, we
exclude casual sales. Thus, those critics who conclude we have not been aggressive
enough may not have read our proposal carefully enough.
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of little substance. As we note in comment b, liability attaches for a
manufacturing defect even though the seller has exercised reason-
able care. Manufacturing defect injuries are random and relatively
rare events. Imposing strict liability achieves all the policy benefits
described in comment c and presents virtually no downside costs.
On the other hand, liability for design and warning defects cannot
be established by merely mouthing the word "defect." An over-
whelming consensus favors some sort of risk-utility balancing test to
judge the adequacy of product design and marketing. 20
Are the risk-utility tests set forth in subsections (2) (b) and (2) (c)
synonymous with a negligence standard? They may be so viewed,
but need not be. Clearly, if risk-utility balancing were accomplished
by utilizing time-of-trial information, the risk-utility test would be
far different from a negligence standard. 2 1 But we have carefully
examined the case law and have concluded that the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions impose a time-of-sale foreseeability limita-
20 See, e.g., Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987), cert. dis-
missed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Lease v. Int'l Harvester Co., 529 N.E.2d 57, 62 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Nichols v. Union
Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980); Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works,
Inc., 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Louisiana law and adopting risk-utility test
as standard for design defect liability); St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283
(Me. 1988); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 518-19 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App.), cert. denied, 494 A.2d 939 (Md. 1985); Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217
(1st Cir. 1990) (applying Massachusetts law); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970
(Mass. 1978); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984); Billota v. Kelley
Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984); Whittley v. City of Meridian, 530 So.2d 1341
(Miss. 1988); Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Mo. 1981); Rix v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195 (Mont. 1986); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395
A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 183 (NJ.
1982); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Roach v. Ko-
nonen, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (Or. 1974); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa.
1978); Motter v. Everest &Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1227 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying
Pennsylvania law) (court held trial judge must "evaluate the risks of a product versus its
social utility" in order to determine whether the issue of defect should be submitted to a
jury); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979); Falk v. Keene
Corp., 782 P.2d 974, 979-80 (Wash. 1989); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655
(Wash. 1986); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (W. Va.
1979). The language in Falk is confusing. It would appear that Washington may now
apply an alternative liability test allowing recovery based on either failed consumer ex-
pectations or risk-utility. See infra.
Several states allow a plaintiff to establish a case of generic defect by establishing
that the product either failed to meet consumer expectations or failed to meet risk-utility
norms. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Dart v.
Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.
1978); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983); Knitz v. Minster
Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982); Falk, 782 P.2d at
980.
21 See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545-46 (N.J.
1982); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 499 A.2d 326, 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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tion on the definitions of design and warning defect,22 subject to
exceptions for post-sale obligations.23 A manufacturer is not held
liable for unforeseeable risks or for failing to utilize unforeseeable
technology to avoid known risks. Comment c reflects this position
as that of our revision. From this perspective, design and warning
defect liability begins to look very much like negligence. However,
it is still possible to articulate a test slightly more stringent than that
used to establish negligence, even with the imposition of a foresee-
ability requirement. Under this rule, liability would be strict if,
utilizing only foreseeable data, the product as designed and mar-
keted should not have been distributed in light of risk-utility
norms. 24 In our opinion, it is unlikely that the distinction between
this test and the negligence test is sufficiently significant to warrant
the creation of a separate track for liability. In any event, we do not
believe that the issue is of sufficient moment to saddle our revision
with it.
2. Risk Utility vs. Consumer Expectations
The black letter rule in our revised section 402A establishes
reasonableness as the governing standard for liability in design de-
22 The overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions that adopt some form of state-of-the-
art policy limit liability to foreseeable risks. See authorities cited supra note 17. The
leading case imposing liability for unforeseeable risks, Beshada, 447 A.2d 539, has been
drastically limited by a later case, Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
Foreseeability is a mandatory element of failure-to-warn criteria in all but a few jurisdic-
tions. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Lia-
bility: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 274-75 (1990).
23 See, e.g., Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915 (Wis. 1979)
(manufacturer who had maintained contact with purchaser owed duty to notify him of
post-sale availability of safety device); see generally Robert A. Royal, Post Sale Warnings: A
Review and Analysis Seeking Fair Compensation Under Uniform Law, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 817
(1984) (discussing post-sale duty to warn).
24 See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal.
1991)
([A] reasonably prudent manufacturer might reasonably decide that the
risk of harm was such as not to require a warning as, for example, if the
manufacturer's own testing showed a result contrary to that of others in
the scientific community. Such a manufacturer might escape liability
under negligence principles. In contrast, under strict liability principles
the manufacturer has no such leeway; the manufacturer is liable if it failed
to give warning of dangers that were known to the scientific community at
the time it manufactured or distributed the product.);
Falk v. Keene Corp., 767 P.2d 576, 580-81 (Wash. Ct. App.) ("[Strict liability] focuses on
a manufacturer's defective product, the burden of an alternative design, and consumer
expectations. As such, it is a fundamentally and irreconcilably different analysis from
negligence, which focuses on a manufacturer's conduct."), aff'd, 782 P.2d 974 (Wash.
1989) (en banc); see also Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1980)
(failure to warn requires scienter, but "strict liability has been upheld as a distinguish-
able doctrine from its counterpart in negligence, based on the fact that it is the inade-
quacy of the warning that is looked to, rather than the conduct of the particular
manufacturer"); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992).
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fect and failure to warn cases. The only serious alternative to such a
standard is the consumer-expectation test. 25 Based on our review of
the cases, however, we conclude that even courts that apply a con-
sumer-expectation test rarely do so without tempering it with signif-
icant risk-utility balancing. 26 Consumer expectations are at the very
least one factor to work into a risk-utility analysis. 27 What consum-
ers expect from product performance suggests how risks are per-
ceived and whether consumers can take self-protective action to
avoid injury. That some courts would put greater emphasis on con-
sumer expectations within the context of risk-utility, and some less,
is not surprising. As long as risk-utility standards are part of the
25 See supra note 20. The six states that have adopted liability based on either con-
sumer expectations or risk-utility must be included in the category of those which allow
liability to be predicated on consumer expectations. See, e.g., Campbell v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982). Other states appear to have adopted a consumer-
expectation test as the sole standard for imposing liability. See, e.g., Lester v. Magic
Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982); Rahmig v. Mosely Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56
(Neb. 1987). The UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(2) (1992) explicitly adopts the consumer-
expectation test as the standard for establishing defect.
The authors confess to having had difficulty in getting a clear reading on the
number of states that use a consumer-expectation test to impose liability. Many states
have expressed some allegiance to a consumer-expectation test. However, the courts
adopting the consumer-expectation test often deny liability on the grounds that the
product met the expectations of the ordinary consumer. See, e.g., Gray v. Manitowoc
Co., 771 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1985); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming
Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 1975). The acid test determining whether liability will
attach based on consumer expectations alone asks whether, if the product met risk-util-
ity norms, liability could be separately established based on failed consumer expecta-
tions. That issue has rarely been addressed directly by the courts.
26 See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978)
(After concluding that risk-utility balancing was necessary to establish defect, the court
said,
In strict liability the plaintiff takes the design as it was finalized in the
finished product and shows it was both dangerous and that it was unrea-
sonable to subject the user to this danger because the user would not
contemplate the danger in the normal and innocent use of the product or
consumption of the product.);
Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 660 (Wash. 1986) (describing the Tabert test
as "a consumer expectations test with a risk-utility base"); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank. v.
Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975) ("In determining the reasonable expectations
of the ordinary consumer, a number of factors must be considered [including t]he rela-
tive cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and
the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk .... ").
27 The original § 402A held strictly liable "[o]ne who sells any product in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Comment i contained the following definition of
"unreasonably dangerous": "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it .. " Id.
cmt. i. In one of the most influential law review articles ever written on the subject,
Professor Wade suggested seven factors that should be balanced in determining
whether a product is "reasonably safe." See John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabil-
ity for Products, 44 Miss. LJ. 825, 837-38 (1973). Wade's sixth factor closely resembles
"consumer expectations."
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mix, whether courts characterize the test for defect as "risk-utility"
or "consumer-expectation" is of relatively minor importance.
Terminology does count for something, and we urge courts to use
terminology that clarifies rather than obfuscates. At most, however,
the various formulations express slightly different points of
emphasis.
A few courts do seem to follow a straightforward consumer-ex-
pectation test, untempered by considerations of reasonable product
safety. 28 As numerous courts and commentators have noted, this
approach to liability is so open-ended and unstructured that it pro-
vides almost no guidance to the jury in determining whether a de-
fect existed.29 It also leaves manufacturers uncertain of the law's
demands regarding product design. Our proposed restatement re-
jects this extreme view and reflects the broad consensus that domi-
nates design and warning defect litigation.
3. Causation
Our proposed revision takes the position that the plaintiff nor-
mally has the burden of proving causation. Comment I details the
various uses of the term "causation" that courts have applied in
products liability decisions. We have not touched on all the causa-
tion problems that arise in products liability litigation-to do so
would require a long exegesis. For example, the phrase "burden of
proof" consists of two components: the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion. Most courts place the latter burden on
the plaintiff with respect to all issues of causation, and initially place
the burden of production regarding defendant identification and
cause-in-fact on the plaintiff as well.30 Many courts minimize the
plaintiff's burden of production regarding but-for proximate causa-
tion and foreseeable consequences. 3 ' This approach comports with
common sense; once the plaintiff has demonstrated a product defect
28 See authorities cited supra note 25.
29 See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984); Turner v. General
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979); W. Page Keeton, Products Liability--
Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REv. 293, 310 (1979); Gary
Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 476 n.241
(1979); Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 714; analysis accompany-
ing § 104.
30 See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1988) ("[J]udgment n.o.v. was proper because the opinions of the [plaintiff's] experts
were inadequate to demonstrate causation [in fact] by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
31 See, e.g., Bastow v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1988)
("Questions of proximate cause generally are for the jury ...."); Landis v. Sumner Mfg.
Co., 750 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (after proof of defective design and cause-in-
fact, issue of whether defect proximately caused injury was for the jury to determine
based on all the factual circumstances).
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and cause-in-fact, it is the defendant who normally raises "but it
would have happened anyway" arguments.
Moreover, our revision does not address issues such as whether
the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing second-collision inju-
ries,3 2 or whether the plaintiff in a warning case is entitled to a pre-
sumption that had a warning been given it would have been
heeded.33 From time to time issues will arise in which courts will be
required to alter traditional burdens of proof. When they do so, it
should be with the realization that they are departing from the gen-
eral governing rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
causation. Case law reflecting these departures from traditional
causation rules does not lend itself to a consensus rule.34 We prefer
to establish the generalization and leave the subtleties to the courts
as the problems arise.
With respect to terminology, we are aware of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts's use of the phrase "legal cause"35 and the confusion
generated in some settings by use of the phrase "proximate
cause." 36 Nevertheless, we believe that the latter phrase is used
32 For an excellent discussion of the conflicting views as to who should bear the
burden of proof as to the extent of second collision injuries once it is established that
defendant contributed to the enhanced injuries, see Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., 360 N.W.2d 2 (Wis. 1984).
33 Several courts have adopted such a presumption. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs.,
498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on procedural grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976); Wooderson v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (Kan.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965
(1984); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Butz v.
Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D. 1989); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831,
838 (Ohio 1981); Technical Chem. Co. v.Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). But
see Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
plaintiff must establish that an adequate warning would have been heeded); Potthoff v.
Alms, 583 P.2d 309, 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming trial court's refusal to instruct
jury that if a warning is given, it will be heeded).
34 The time is not yet ripe for drawing any conclusions with regard to the warning
presumption, as too few courts have spoken definitively on the subject. Furthermore, it
is not yet clear what kind of evidence will be sufficient to rebut such a presumption.
Compare Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1986) with Overpeck v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 823 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1987).
35 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 431 (1965).
36 See, e.g., NEBRASKAJURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.41 (1969):
By "proximate cause" is meant a moving or effective cause or fault which,
in a natural and continuous sequence (unbroken by an efficient interven-
ing cause), produces the (harm, accident, injury, collision, occurrence)
and without which the (harm, accident, injury, collision, occurrence)
would not have occurred.
A "proximate result" is that result brought about or produced by a
proximate cause. It must have been a natural and probable consequence
which was, or ought to have been, reasonably foreseen or anticipated in
the light of attendant circumstances. (It is not required, however, that
the particular [harm, accident, injury, collision, occurrence], or the pre-
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much more frequently than the former,3 7 and should not create con-
fusion given the content of comment I.
4. Prescription Drugs38
We have presented two alternative versions of comment k, each
addressing prescription drugs. The shorter version, which limits
plaintiffs in this area to actions for failure to warn, reflects the tradi-
tional approach. The longer version, which allows for limited judi-
cial review of drug design, reflects recent developments in a
growing minority of jurisdictions. We prefer the shorter version
embracing traditional law; in our view, courts should not review the
adequacy of prescription drug designs. But if one views the recent
departures from that tradition as the beginning of a significant
trend, one should at least consider an approach more in keeping
with that trend. In any event, one's choice should be constrained to
one or the other proffered alternatives, both of which were drafted
in light of the issues raised by courts inclined to question the tradi-
tional "no design liability" gloss placed on comment k. These is-
sues include whether comment k should apply only to prescription
drugs; whether the defendant drug companies should bear the bur-
den of proving the unavoidably unsafe nature of their drugs, and if
so, how heavy that burden should be; whether judges or juries
should perform the relevant design review; and whether, if com-
ment k applies and bars strict liability for drug design under section
402A, the plaintiff should be allowed to seek judicial review of the
defendant's design choices on the basis of negligence.
cise nature and extent thereof, or the exact manner of its happening, was
or should have been foreseen.).
See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LiABILTrr:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 240-42 (2d ed. 1992).
37 The following LEXIS searches were conducted in the products liability library
using the combined state and federal files: prox! caus! and legal! caus!. The search
revealed that in the last ten years courts have used "proximate cause" 4,261 times, and
"legal cause" only 606. Thus, courts favored "proximate cause" over "legal cause" by
more than seven to one.
38 Almost alljursdictions pay some allegiance to comment k. The text of comment
k is reproduced in an appendix to this Article. We have found only one state court
decision that claims to reject comment k. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52
(Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). A handful of states have not spoken to the issue.
The various interpretations of comment k are discussed in the ensuing material. The
subject of liability for prescription drugs has drawn considerable academic attention.
See, e.g., Frank M. McClellan, Strict Liability For Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through
the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REV. I (1978);
Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1 (1973);
Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k andfor Strict Tort Liability,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853 (1983); John P. Reilly, The Erosion of Comment k, 14 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 255 (1989); Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning
and Policy Behind Comment k, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139 (1985); Sidney H. Willig, The
Comment k Character: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545 (1978).
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Our first alternative version of comment k reflects a disposition
to exclude judicial inquiry into any of the foregoing issues. The sec-
ond alternative version intends to exclude inquiry into the last two
issues identified above, but arguably leaves the first three to devel-
oping case law. The second alternative on its terms limits itself to
prescription drugs. But having to some extent opened drug design
to judicial review, the second alternative invites, to a greater extent
than the first, further developments with respect to the first three
issues identified above.
In attacking the "no drug design liability" gloss traditionally
placed on comment k, courts in recent years have re-examined the
text of that comment and have purported to find therein support for
the various positions they have adopted. In doing so courts have
committed serious error. Indeed, in a growing number of states the
case law addressing the standard for establishing liability in pre-
scription drug cases is in disarray. The problem can in large part be
attributed to the existing comment k, which is poorly drafted and
internally inconsistent. But the major difficulty with using the ex-
isting comment k to resolve questions of whether and how courts
should review design of prescription drugs is that these issues were
not at all within the contemplation of its drafters. To draw on com-
ment k as authority to resolve problems that no one even contem-
plated at the time of its adoption is sheer foolishness.
Before undertaking a search for the appropriate standard to
govern drug design and warning litigation, it is imperative that we
fully understand the factual predicate that triggers the need for a
discrete design standard. The overwhelming majority of prescrip-
tion drug liability cases are based on the failure to adequately warn
or inform3 9 either the doctor or patient of risks attending ingestion
of the drug. Cases alleging that a drug was defectively designed are
uncommon.
40
39 Drug warnings can serve either to reduce the risk of injury or to provide a patient
or doctor with the information to choose a form of drug therapy that involves a non-
reducible risk of injury. For an extensive discussion of these two types of warnings, see
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 22, at 285-89; see also Wooderson, 681 P.2d at 1057
(risk-reduction warning) and Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1280-82 (informed choice warning).
40 See infra note 65 (listing cases in which courts have dealt directly with allegations
that a drug was defectively designed). Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d
652 (Ist Cir. 1981), is widely believed to be the first case directly raising a defective drug
design claim. However, in an early article on the subject of liability for prescription
drugs, Professor Merrill suggests that two 1969 drug cases relating to the drug
Quadrigen may qualify as the progenitors of this cause of action. See Merrill, supra note
38, at 35 (citing Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd as modified, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969), and Stromsodt v. Parke Davis & Co., 257 F.
Supp. 991 (D. N.D. 1966), aft'd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969)).
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Most design litigation has involved industrial or non-descrip-
tion consumer products.4' Plaintiffs base their claims on the ground
that a better alternative design would have avoided the injury. The
mere fact that a danger was obvious or adequately warned against
will not protect the manufacturer from liability.42 Momentary for-
getfulness and inattention cause many injuries. Products are often
foreseeably misused, causing injury to the users or third persons.
Product warnings cannot bear the full burden of ensuring that prod-
ucts will be used safely. If a sensible design alternative can signifi-
cantly reduce risk, the law will demand that the manufacturer design
out the risk rather than merely warn against it. 4 3
In cases involving drugs, the claim of defective design is much
more difficult to sustain. Different drugs provide different benefits
to patients. What may be beneficial to one group of patients may be
less so for another, who may in turn benefit from a drug with a
slightly different composition. It appears elementary that so long as
a group exists for whom the drug in question is the drug of choice,
then the issue of design has no place in the applicable liability law.
The only issue is whether the drug manufacturer provided the pre-
scribing physician with adequate warnings of the drug's benefits and
detriments, so that the physician could make an intelligent judg-
ment regarding prescription of the drug. Unlike cases involving in-
dustrial and consumer products, in which design liability is
necessary to protect against consumer inadvertence and product
misuse, here such liability is neither necessary nor desirable. As
long as the dangers related to drug ingestion are fully warned
against, the physician stands as an expert intermediary whose func-
41 An extensive literature has developed describing how courts have dealt with clas-
sic design defect litigation. For a list of the major articles and cases, see Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 22, at 271 n.23.
42 See, e.g., Stanton G. Darling II, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and a Survey of Its
Vitality, 29 MERCER L. REV. 583, 588 (1978); Patricia Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not
Make A Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1065, 1083 (1973); see also Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982);
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
43 See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978), in which the
court held:
An adequate warning may reduce the likelihood of injury to the user of a
product in some cases. We decline, however, to adopt any rule which
permits a manufacturer or designer to discharge its total responsibility to
workers by simply warning of the dangers of a product. Whether or not
adequate warnings are given is a factor to be considered on the issue of
negligence, but warnings cannot absolve the manufacturer or designer of
all responsibility for the safety of the product ....
[A] warning is not effective in eliminating injuries due to instinctual reac-
tions, momentary inadvertence, or forgetfulness on the part of a worker.
One of the primary purposes of safety devices is to guard against such
foreseeable situations.
Id. at 1192 (footnote omitted).
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tion it is to make informed and knowledgeable decisions about the
appropriateness of the drug for the particular patient.44 In an area
in which such careful attention is given to the individual patient and
to the duration of product use, inadvertence and misuse are not sig-
nificant problems. And even if they were, there is no justification for
denying one set of patients the benefits of an important drug merely
because some doctors or patients will not take the trouble to read
warnings or follow instructions as to proper use.
If the aforementioned observations are accurate, then the only
drug design cases warranting judicial inquiry are those in which the
drugs in question have no special utility for any group of patients.
The claim must be either that the drug was useless, or that a fully
acceptable alternative drug existed that was just as effective but had
fewer of the detriments of the drug in question. Cases predicated
on such claims have, in fact, been litigated.45 However, in assessing
whether such design claims are necessary to prosecute a drug case,
it is important to recall that the failure-to-warn claim stands in the
wings. In our hypothetical drug design case, the manufacturer
would almost certainly have run afoul of its obligation to warn.46 To
warn adequately, the manufacturer would have to inform the medi-
cal profession either that its product is useless or that a fully accept-
able alternative to the drug exists that has all the benefits but fewer
of the detriments of the drug in question. If the manufacturer failed
to give such warnings, it would be liable for that failure. And in fact
the manufacturer would presumably prefer to withdraw the drug
than to warn, because to give such warnings would destroy the
drug's marketability.
The availability of a failure-to-warn cause of action in drug
cases does not ipso facto support the denial of design claims. One
could argue that a plaintiff should be allowed to proceed on both
44 The overwhelming majority of courts limit a manufacturer's duty to warn of risks
relating to the use of ethical drugs to the physician alone. In Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498
F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974),Judge Wisdom set forth the
rationale that supports this almost universal rule. Some courts have made an exception
and required direct warning to consumers in the case of birth control pills or vaccines
that are provided to the public without any medical intermediary. See id. at 1276 (quot-
ing Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968)); MacDonald v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
45 See cases cited infra note 65.
46 In most of the cases cited infra note 65, the plaintiff has proceeded on both de-
sign and failure-to-warn claims. In rare cases, the design claim may be the only viable
one. Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987), may be such a case. In Toner,
the plaintiff, who suffered injury after being immunized against pertussis by the Lederle
drug Tri-Immunol, contended that the defendant drug company was negligent in failing
to develop a vaccine (fractionated cell product) that had less of the paralysis-causing side
effects of Tri-Immunol. Id. at 301. Because there was no alternative product available
on the market, it would be difficult to sustain a failure-to-warn cause of action.
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grounds. However, almost all observers agree that significant limi-
tations must be imposed on drug design litigation. In seeking to
ascertain appropriate limitations, it is good to know that the drug
design claim is rarely, if ever, the only road to plaintiff recovery.
Having stated the problem, we must now ask whether the ex-
isting comment k speaks to the question of whether courts should
exercise design review for drugs the dangers of which are fully
warned against. As noted earlier, we believe that one cannot fairly
read comment k to address this question. Our reasons for so con-
cluding are several. First, when the ALI in 1961 first raised the issue
of liability for prescription drugs,47 design review of industrial and
consumer products was in its infancy. The classic no-duty defenses
of patent danger,48 intended use, 49 and no-bystander recovery50
stood as significant obstacles to the imposition of design liability of
any kind. The only reported cases were those in which the manufac-
turer had committed an "inadvertent design error."5' The entire
body of cases predicated on "conscious design choices"5 2 was sim-
ply not part of the American product liability scene at the time. To
conclude that at this primitive stage of product design liability com-
ment k sought to establish sophisticated rules governing judicial re-
view of conscious drug design choices is simply untenable. It is the
functional equivalent of utilizing a modem day catalytic converter to
neutralize the pollutants on a Model T Ford.
47 38 A.L.I. PROC. 90-92 (1962).
48 The leading case expressing the patent danger rule was Campo v. Scofield, 95
N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950). Campo was overruled by Micallefv. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571
(N.Y. 1976).
49 It should be recalled that the case heralding the adoption of strict liability in tort
limited liability to defects that make a product unsafe for its intended use. See Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). This position was later modi-
fied in Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1972), to include liability
for reasonably foreseeable uses.
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) contained a caveat indicating
that the American Law Institute expressed no opinion as to whether § 402A applied to
persons other than users or consumers. See also id. cmt. o. The unanimous opinion of
the courts since 1964 has been that § 402A applies to bystanders. See, e.g., Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969); Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825
(Wis. 1972).
51 Inadvertent design errors are design defects that cause products to fail to per-
form their intended functions. They are functionally similar to manufacturing defects.
See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1547-1552 (1973). RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965), establishing a broad rule of manufacturer liabil-
ity for negligent design, relies entirely for its authority upon decisions involving
inadvertent design errors. Henderson, supra, at 1550 n.70.
52 Conscious design choices are choices deliberately made by product designers
with full knowledge of the risks created thereby. Presumably, the benefits generated by
such choices outweigh the risks. See generally Henderson, supra note 51.
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Second, there is strong evidence that Dean Prosser, who was
the Reporter for the Second Restatement and who dominated the
development of section 402A, was addressing a very different prob-
lem in his draft of comment k. Section 402A adopted for the first
time a rule of strict liability for manufacturing defect cases. 53 A
plaintiff injured as a result of a manufacturing defect could no
longer be confronted with testimony of reasonable quality control
on the part of the manufacturer.5 4 By definition, manufacturing de-
fects arise only sporadically and are idiosyncratic in nature. Prosser
and others were concerned that manufacturers of even well-
designed drugs of unquestioned social utility would be subject to
liability for idiosyncratic drug reactions whose dangers were known
and warned against. In the ALI proceedings concerning this issue,
Prosser gave the example of a cancer-curing drug known to have
fatal consequences to a small percentage of users. 55 At another ses-
sion, he said that comment k was designed to protect "the person
who is selling a drug which is necessarily unsafe although its utility
outweighs the risk."' 56 In his treatise on the law of torts, Prosser
cites an article by Professor FlemingJames 57 advocating that liability
be imposed without regard to defect for idiosyncratic drug reactions,
and says:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous
products should make good the harm, distribute it by liability in-
surance, and add the cost to the price of the product, encounters
reason for pause, when we consider that two of the greatest medi-
cal boons to the human race, penicillin and cortisone, both have
their dangerous side effects, and that drug companies might well
have been deterred from producing and selling them.58
Since comment k speaks only to cases in which no defect of any
kind exists, there is almost no warrant for citing comment k as au-
53 The thrust of § 402A was clearly directed toward manufacturing defects. See
supra note 7.
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) and cmts. a, b (1965).
55 38 A.L.I. PROc. 54, 93 (1962).
56 41 A.L.I. PROc. 360 (1965). This argument is not frivolous. It has recently been
raised anew in James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Norms in Products Litigation: Liability For
Allergic Reactions, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 761 (1990). Courts have used comment k to deny
liability in deciding such claims. See, e.g., Stone v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 447
So.2d 1301, 1304 (Ala. 1984) (no liability attaches to Thorazine merely because it causes
cholestatic jaundice in a small percentage of cases. Thorazine does not present unrea-
sonable risks and the risks are fully warned against); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416
F.2d 417, 425 & nn. 11-12 (2d Cir. 1969) (comment h precludes liability for idiosyncratic
reaction arising from useful drug whose dangers are adequately warned against).
57 FlemingJames, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enter-
prise Liability, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1550, 1557 (1966).
58 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 at 661 (4th ed.
1971).
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thority regarding whether and under what test drug manufacturers
should be liable for defective design.
The text of comment k itself provides little insight. As Profes-
sor Joseph Page has so ably demonstrated, comment k is truly an
enigma. 59 Page notes that neither Prosser nor any other ALI mem-
ber indicated how section 402A would apply to prescription drugs
without the comment k exemption. 60 To understand the scope of an
exemption, one must articulate the substratum to which the exemp-
tion relates. Furthermore, the language of comment k appears to be
directed to warnings rather than design. The discussion exempting
new and experimental drugs from strict liability suggests that there
is no liability for failure to warn against unknown or unforeseeable risks.
However, the language of comment k and its examples refers
throughout to application of the comment k exemption only when
known risks are warned against, implying that liability might attach
when unknown or unforeseeable risks were realized.
It seems clear that instead of speculating about the meaning of
comment k as applied to a problem never contemplated by its draft-
ers, we should direct our attention to how the courts have grappled
with the question of judicial review of drug design. We acknowl-
edge that courts have sought to justify their decisions by using the
comment k language to bolster one position or another. 6i Since we
view this use of comment k as illegitimate, we shall direct our atten-
tion to the holdings and policy discussions in the cases, disregarding
the interpretive gloss given to the existing comment k.
It is not at all difficult to summarize the standards courts have
used in deciding prescription drug cases. The overwhelming major-
ity of drug cases have been based on failure to warn. Almost with-
out exception, the courts impose a standard of reasonable
foreseeability on the drug manufacturer, who is held to the standard
59 Page, supra note 38, at 864-72.
60 Thus, the notion that comment k exempts drugs from actions for strict tort liabil-
ity based on defective design or failure to warn seems strangely inconsistent with Pros-
ser's position that all design and warning claims are based in negligence. See supra note
7. If all design and warning claims are based in negligence, no exemption seems
necessary.
61 See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 305 n.6 (Idaho 1987); White v.
Wyeth Labs., 533 N.E.2d 748, 752 n.4 (Ohio 1988).
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of an expert.62 Most courts have openly admitted that this test is
functionally identical to a negligence standard.63
Regarding design review, the case law in a growing minority of
states is very confused. Some courts take the position that while
comment k exempts all prescription drugs from design review under
strict liability,64 a cause of action based on negligence may neverthe-
less be prosecuted. Other courts hold that prescription drugs are
not automatically exempt from strict liability. Rather, they advocate
a case-by-case examination to determine whether the drug is "un-
avoidably unsafe."'65 To resolve that issue, a court must determine
that "there must be at the time of the subject product's distribution,
62 See, e.g., DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983);
Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); Basko v. Ster-
ling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988); Woodill v.
Parke Davis & Co., 374 N.E.2d 683, 686-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 402 N.E.2d 194
(Ill. 1980); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 116 (Iowa 1986).
63 Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1080 (1981); Basko, 416 F.2d at 426; Snawder v. Cohen, 749 F. Supp. 1473, 1476 n.3
(W.D. Ky. 1990); Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 296 (N.D. Ga.
1985), aft'd, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Stone v. Smith,
Kline & French Lab., 447 So.2d 1301, 1303 n.2 (Ala. 1984); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
795 P.2d 915, 928 (Kan. 1990); Kinney v. Hutchinson, 468 So.2d 714, 718 (La. Ct. App.
1985); Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So.2d 42, 45 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
64 See, e.g., Brown, 751 P.2d at 481; Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 91-92
(Utah 1991) (in both Brown and Grundberg the courts mentioned exemption for strict
liability only). For cases representing the traditional rule immunizing drug companies
against design litigation, see Basko, 416 F.2d at 425 n.12; Snawder, 749 F. Supp. at 1476
(apparently providing drug manufacturers with full immunity from design defect litiga-
tion, with no reference to case-by-case determination); Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F.
Supp. 931, 933 (M.D. Ga. 1986); Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (apparently providing manu-
facturers of ethical drugs with across-the-board immunity from design litigation); Moore
v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986); Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 273
N.W.2d 476, 479 (Mich. 1979). Butsee Koehler v. Wyeth Labs., 1987 WL 47831, at *2-4
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 8, 1987) (court makes factual investigation as to whether drug was un-
avoidably unsafe). This is only a partial listing of cases that adopt the traditional view. It
is fair to say that almost all courts other than those listed infra note 65 adopt the tradi-
tional view that drug litigation is based solely on failure-to-warn grounds.
65 See, e.g., Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., 719 F. Supp. 470, 477 (N.D. W. Va. 1989),
aff'd, 916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp. 573, 577-
78 (W.D. La.) (apparently adopting a case-by-case approach, but applying a high thresh-
old test to be administered by the court as to whether there is a jury question; stating
that it is presumptively inappropriate for ajury to apply a pure "risk utility test"), aft'd,
864 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1988); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432, 433 (D.
Minn. 1988); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 612-13 (Ark. 1991); Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983); Adams v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 576 So.2d 728, 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Toner, 732 P.2d at 308-09; Savina,
795 P.2d at 924-26; Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 382-83 (N.J. 1984); Davila
v. Bodelson, 704 P.2d 1119 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); While, 533 N.E.2d at 752; Senn v.
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 751 P.2d 215, 218 n.4 (Or. 1988); Castrignano v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988).
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no feasible alternative design which on balance accomplishes the
subject product's purpose with a lesser risk." Furthermore, the
courts relying on the language of comment k hold that the balance
need only "apparently" tip toward the product's benefit at the time
of distribution. 66 Once again, some courts take the position that a
drug that meets this standard is exempt from strict liability but re-
mains open to an attack based on negligence.67
None of these positions, each based on a close re-reading of the
text of comment k, make much sense. Consider first those courts
that undertake a case-by-case approach to comment k application.
To discover whether a comment k exemption from strict liability is
appropriate, they undertake risk-utility balancing, insisting that this
balancing process be performed as of the time when the drug was
distributed.68 This is nothing other than a negligence test. If a
court finds that the product meets the threshold test for a strict lia-
bility exemption, it has perforce made a finding that the defendant
was not negligent. How then can the courts declare that the exemp-
tion is only for strict liability?
What is in fact happening is that courts are engaging in initial
screening to decide whether a risk-utility case is at all viable. In do-
ing so, they inquire whether a drug manufacturer could conclude
that the drug design was "apparently useful" at the time of distribu-
tion. If the defendant meets this threshold, there is no sense in al-
lowing the straightforward negligence case to go to a jury. By
definition, the courts have already decided that the manufacturer,
given the knowledge that it had or should have had at the time of
distribution, was justified in distributing the drug. One perceptive
court has noted this anomaly,69 but believes that the language of the
existing comment k dictates this kind of nonsensical result. As we
have already shown, however, comment k does not stand in the way
of formulating rational rules for design review of drug cases. Com-
ment k never addressed the question.
The same problem exists in cases that provide an across-the-
board exemption from strict liability. The primary reason that these
courts reject design review for drugs is because they believe risk-
utility balancing for drugs to be unworkable. 70 It becomes no less
unworkable in the context of a negligence case.
66 Williams, 686 F. Supp. at 577-78 (high threshold to make a risk-utility case); West,
806 S.W.2d at 613; Adams, 576 So.2d at 733; Toner, 732 P.2d at 306-07.
67 See authorities cited supra note 24.
68 See, e.g., West, 806 S.W.2d at 613; Adams, 576 So.2d at 733; Toner, 732 P.2d at 306-
07; Savina, 795 P.2d at 926.
69 Toner, 732 P.2d at 309-11.
70 See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 478-79 (Cal. 1988).
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We noted earlier that it would be unlikely indeed for a drug
design declared unreasonably dangerous under a risk-utility stan-
dard not also to support a cause of action for failure to warn.71 It is
hard to see how a drug manufacturer could honestly market a drug
if it had to inform physicians that its drug had dangers that could be
avoided by prescribing an alternative with all the benefits and fewer
of the detriments of the drug in question. We thus believe that drug
design review should be barred on both strict liability and negli-
gence grounds. Deserving plaintiffs would lose very few, if any, le-
gitimate cases. Courts would, however, be spared the need to
review design in an area in which risk-utility balancing is extraordi-
narily difficult to accomplish.
If, however, courts prefer a case-by-case approach to the issue
of drug design review, they should opt for a threshold risk-utility
test that asks whether at the time of distribution the manufacturer of
a drug had "apparent" reasons for believing that the product met
risk-utility norms. Because this is fundamentally a negligence test, it
makes no sense to put a manufacturer through an ordinary negli-
gence test once it has passed the threshold test for design immunity.
Furthermore, since such a screening process implicates important
public policy questions, the issue should be for the court as a matter
of law rather than for the jury.
We have provided two alternate drafts for comment k reflecting
the views we have set forth above. As noted earlier, this is not an
area in which we can satisfy ourselves with a restatement of the case
law. Case law that is unintelligible cannot be intelligibly restated.
There is a need in this area to clarify the issues and to provide direc-
tion to the courts as to how this very special genre of cases can be
sensibly approached.
5. Misuse, Modification, and Alteration
Problems related to product misuse, modification, and altera-
tion are the subject of considerable litigation. When these forms of
user and third-party conduct are extreme, the defendant may legiti-
mately claim that the product was simply non-defective. It may be
impossible or impractical to design or warn against some forms of
misuse. As one court has noted, one cannot hold the manufacturer
of a knife liable when the plaintiff uses it as a toothpick and then
complains that the sharp edge cuts. 72 A knife cannot be designed to
cut meat and not injure human tissue. More commonly, the plaintiff
is able to establish that the product was defective, and the question
71 See supra note 46.
72 General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977).
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then becomes whether the harm was within the risk created by the
defective product. Stated in this way, the issue is that of proximate
cause. Normally proximate cause is part of the plaintiff's burden of
proof; however, a fair number of courts and products reform stat-
utes have taken the position that product misuse, alteration, or
modification are affirmative defenses. 73 Although we believe there
is no good reason why the plaintiff should not bear the usual burden
of proof, subject to the caveats described in the previous discussion
of causation, we have left this issue to developing law. Once courts
perceive that these various forms of product misuse do not raise dis-
crete issues but are part of classic proximate cause analysis, they will
most likely revert to placing the burden of proof onto the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
It has not been a well-kept secret. Anyone familiar with the law
of products liability knows that section 402A is out of date and re-
quires revision. We are heartened that the ALI has taken up the task
of formally revising its products liability provisions. We began our
own revision efforts with the guiding principle that we would seek to
write a Revised Restatement section that reflects those areas in
which the courts by and large agree. We were pleased to discover
that substantial agreement exists over much of the terrain of prod-
ucts liability law. Our Revised Restatement, together with our "offi-
cial" comments, reflect this consensus. Our draft takes no formal
position on much of the debate over terminology. Frankly, the buzz
words have stood in the way of rational analysis of the underlying
problems. In capturing consensus we have not papered over real
differences. Rather, we have simply allowed sufficient breathing
room for those who wish to continue debating the verbal niceties.
But the remaining substantive differences constitute a relatively
small slice of a very large pie. We have taken clear positions on a
significant number of the core issues whenever we could detect
broad agreement approaching consensus. 74 We offer this Revised
Restatement to the legal community with the hope that, in the de-
bate it may generate, its consensus-based tone remains intact.
73 For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.,
495 A.2d 348 (Md. 1985).
74 See supra note 19.
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Appendix: Original § 402A and Comments
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer
1 (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
2 unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
3 property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
4 caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
5 if
6 (a) the seller is engaged in the business of
7 selling such a product, and
8 (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
9 consumer without substantial change in the condition in
10 which it is sold.
11 (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
12 (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
13 the preparation and sale of his product, and
14 (b) the user or consumer has not bought the
15 product from or entered into any contractual relation with
16 the seller.
Caveat:
The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules
stated in this Section may not apply
(1) to harm to persons other than users or consumers;
(2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or
otherwise substantially changed before it reaches the user or
consumer; or
(3) to the seller of a component part of a product to be
assembled.
Comment:
a. This Section states a special rule applicable to sellers of
products. The rule is one of strict liability, making the seller
subject to liability to the user or consumer even though he has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the
product. The Section is inserted in the Chapter dealing with the
negligence liability of suppliers of chattels, for convenience of
reference and comparison with other Sections dealing with
negligence. The rule stated here is not exclusive, and does not
preclude liability based upon the alternative ground of negligence
of the seller, where such negligence can be proved.
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b. History. Since the early days of the common law those
engaged in the business of selling food intended for human con-
sumption have been held to a high degree of responsibility for
their products. As long ago as 1266 there were enacted special
criminal statutes imposing penalties upon victualers, vintners,
brewers, butchers, cooks, and other persons who supplied "cor-
ruptV' food and drink. In the earlier part of this century this
ancient attitude was reflected in a series of decisions in which
the courts of a number of states sought to find some method of
holding the seller of food liable to the ultimate consumer even
though there was no showing of negligence on the part of the
seller. These decisions represented a departure from, and an
exception to, the general rule that a supplier of chattels was not
liable to third persons in the absence of negligence or privity of
contract. In the beginning, these decisions displayed consider-
able ingenuity in evolving more or less fictitious theories of lia-
bility to fit the case. The various devices included an agency
of the intermediate dealer or another to purchase for the con-
sumer, or to sell for the seller; a theoretical assignment of the
seller's warranty to the intermediate dealer; a third party bene-
ficiary contract; and an implied representation that the food was
fit for consumption because it was placed on the market, as well as
numerous others. In later years the courts have become more or
less agreed upon the theory of a "warranty" from the seller to
the consumer, either "running with the goods" by analogy to a
covenant running with the land, or made directly to the consumer.
Other decisions have indicated that the basis is merely one of
strict liability in tort, which is not dependent upon either contract
or negligence.
Recent decisions, since 1950, have extended this special rule
of strict liability beyond the seller of food for human consump-
tion. The first extension was into the closely analogous cases of
other products intended for intimate bodily use, where, for
example, as in the case of cosmetics, the application to the body
of the consumer is external rather than internal. Beginning in
£958 with a Michigan case involving cinder building blocks,
a number of recent decisions have discarded any limitation to
intimate association with the body, and have extended the rule
of strict liability to cover the sale of any product which, if it
should prove to be defective, may be expected to cause physical
harm to the consumer or his property.
c. On whatever theory, the justification for the strict lia-
bility has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product
for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special
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responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and
does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which
it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will
stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for
consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance
can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is
entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone,
and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.
d. The rule stated in this Section is not limited to the sale
of food for human consumption, or other products for intimate
bodily use, although it will obviously include them. It extends
to any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same
condition, in which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or
consumer. Thus the rule stated applies to an automobile, a tire,
an airplane, a grinding wheel, a water heater, a gas stove, a
power tool, a riveting machine, a chair, and an insecticide. It
applies also to products which, if they are defective, may be
expected to and do cause only "physical harm" in the form of
damage to the user's land or chattels, as in the case of animal
food or a herbicide.
e. Normally the rule stated in this Section will be applied
to articles which already have undergone some processing before
sale, since there is today little in the way of consumer products
which will reach the consumer without such processing. The
rule is not, however, so limited, and the supplier of poisonous
mushrooms which are neither cooked, canned, packaged, nor
otherwise treated is subject to the liability here stated.
f. Business of selling. The rule stated in this Section ap-
plies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for
use or consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer
of such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor,
and to the operator of a restaurant. It is not necessary that the
seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such products.
Thus the rule applies to the owner of a motion picture theatre who
sells popcorn or ice cream, either for consumption on the premises
or in packages to be taken home.
The rule does not, however, apply to the occasional seller
of food or other such products who is not engaged in that ac-
tivity as a part of his business. Thus it does not apply to the
housewife who, on one occasion, sells to her neighbor a jar of
jam or a pound of sugar. Nor does it apply to the owner of an
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automobile who, on one occasion, sells it to his neighbor, or even
sells it to a dealer in used cars, and this even though he is fully
aware that the dealer plans to resell it. The basis for the rule
is the ancient one of the special responsibility for the safety
of the public undertaken by one who enters into the business
of supplying human beings with products which may endanger
the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance
upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such
goods. This basis is lacking in the case of the ordinary individual
who makes the isolated sale, and he is not liable to a third person,
or even to his buyer, in the absence of his negligence. An analogy
may be found in the provision of the Uniform Sales Act, § 15,
which limits the implied warranty of merchantable quality to
sellers who deal in such goods; and in the similar limitation of
the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-314, to a seller who is a
merchant. This Section is also not intended to apply to sales of
the stock of merchants out of the usual course of business, such
as execution sales, bankruptcy sales, bulk sales, and the like.
g. Defective condition. The rule stated in this Section ap-
plies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's
hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is
not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and
subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the
time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in
a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the
particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evi-
dence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it
was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
Safe condition at the time of delivery by the seller will, how-
ever, include proper packaging, necessary sterilization, and other
precautions required to permit the product to remain safe for a
normal length of time when handled in a normal manner.
h. A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe
for normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from
abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked
against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal prepara-
tion for use, as where too much salt is added to food, or from
abnormal consumption, as where a child eats too much candy and
is made ill, the seller is not liable. Where, however, he has rea-
son to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use,
as where a drug is sold which is safe only in limited doses, he
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may be required to give adequate warning of the danger (see
Comment j), and a product sold without such warning is in a
defective condition.
The defective condition may arise not only from harmful
ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself either as to
presence or quantity, but also from foreign objects contained
in the product, from decay or deterioration before sale, or from
the way in which the product is prepared or packed. No reason
is apparent for distinguishing between the product itself and
the container in which it is supplied; and the two are purchased
by the user or consumer as an integrated whole. Where the con-
tainer is itself dangerous, the product is sold in a defective condi-
tion. Thus a carbonated beverage in a bottle which is so weak,
or cracked, or jagged at the edges, or bottled under such excessive
pressure that it may explode or otherwise cause harm to the
person who handles it, is in a defective and dangerous condition.
The container cannot logically be separated from the contents
when the two are sold as a unit, and the liability stated in this
Section arises not only when the consumer drinks the beverage
and is poisoned by it, but also when he is injured by the bottle
while he is handling it preparatory to consumption.
i. Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section
applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Many products
cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any
food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from
over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to dia-
betics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument
of torture. That is not what is meant by "unreasonably danger-
ous" in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people
drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey,
containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dan-
gerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco
containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dan-
gerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely be-
cause, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries
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and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with
poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
j. Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product
from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required
to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use.
The seller may reasonably assume that those with common aller-
gies, as for example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of
them, and he is not required to warn against them. Where,
however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substan-
tial number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient
is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one
which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the
product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he
has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed
human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence
of the ingredient and the danger. Likewise in the case of poison-
ous drugs, or those unduly dangerous for other reasons, warning
as to use may be required.
But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products,
or ingredients in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially
so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a long period of
time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally
known and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages
are an example, as are also those of foods containing such sub-
stances as saturated fats, which may over a period of time have a
deleterious effect upon the human heart.
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume
that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a
warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products
which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite in-
capable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs. An out-
standing example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself in-
variably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use
of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoid-
able high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and
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warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The
same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many
of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical
experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even
of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies
the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not
to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences at-
tending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply
the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, at-
tended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
1. User or consumer. In order for the rule stated in this
Section to apply, it is not necessary that the ultimate user or
consumer have acquired the product directly from the seller,
although the rule applies equally if he does so. He may have
acquired it through one or more intermediate dealers. It is
not even necessary that the consumer have purchased the
product at all. He may be a member of the family of the final
purchaser, or his employee, or a guest at his table, or a mere donee
from the purchaser. The liability stated is one in tort, and does
not require any contractual relation, or privity of contract, be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant.
"Consumers" include not only those who in fact consume the
product, but also those who prepare it for consumption; and
the housewife who contracts tularemia while cooking rabbits for
her husband is included within the rule stated in this Section,
as is also the husband who is opening a bottle of beer for his
wife to drink. Consumption includes all ultimate uses for which
the product is intended, and the customer in a beauty shop to
whose hair a permanent wave solution is applied by the shop
is a consumer. "User" includes those who are passively enjoying
the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in auto-
mobiles or airplanes, as well as those who are utilizing it for the
purpose of doing work upon it, as in the case of an employee
of the ultimate buyer who is making repairs upon the automobile
which he has purchased.
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Illustration:
1. A manufactures and packs a can of beans, which he
sells to B, a wholesaler. B sells the beans to C, a jobber,
who resells it to D, a retail grocer. E buys the can of beans
from D, and gives it to F. F serves the beans at lunch
to G, his guest. While eating the beans, G breaks a tooth,
on a pebble of the size, shape, and color of a bean, which
no reasonable inspection could possibly have discovered.
There is satisfactory evidence that the pebble was in the can
of beans when it was opened. Although there is no negli-
gence on the part of A, B, C, or D, each of them is subject
to liability to G. On the other hand E and F, who have not
sold the beans, are not liable to G in the absence of some
negligence on their part.
m. "Warranty." The liability stated in this Section does
not rest upon negligence. It is strict liability, similar in its
nature to that covered by Chapters 20 and 21. The basis of
liability is purely one of tort.
A number of courts, seeking a theoretical basis for the lia-
bility, have resorted to a "warranty," either running with the
goods sold, by analogy to covenants running with the land, or
made directly to the consumer without contract. In some in-
stances this theory has proved to be an unfortunate one. Al-
though warranty was in its origin a matter of tort liability,
and it is generally agreed that a tort action will still lie for its
breach, it has become so identified in practice with a contract
of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant that the warranty
theory has become something of an obstacle to the recognition of
the strict liability where there is no such contract. There is
nothing in this Section which would prevent any court from
treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user or
consumer. But if this is done, it should be recognized and under-
stood that the "warranty" is a very different kind of warranty
from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not
subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to
surround such sales.
The rule stated in this Section does not require any re-
liance on the part of the consumer upon the reputation, skill,
or judgment of the seller who is to be held liable, nor any repre-
sentation or undertaking on the part of that seller. The seller
is strictly liable although, as is frequently the case, the con-
sumer does not even know who he is at the time of consumption.
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The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial
Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by limitations on
the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer"
and "seller" in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required
to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time
after it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act. The con-
sumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and
it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether
it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to
and accompanying the product into the consumer's hands. In
short, "warranty" must be given a new and different meaning if
it is used in connection with this Section. It is much simpler
to regard the liability here stated as merely one of strict liability
in tort.
n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which
this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but
is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (see
§ 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not
a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to
discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the pos-
sibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contribu-
tory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes
under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this
Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or con-
sumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and never-
theless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
Comment on Caveat:
o. Injuries to non-users and non-consumers. Thus far the
courts, in applying the rule stated in this Section, have not gone
beyond allowing recovery to users and consumers, as those terms
are defined in Comment 1. Casual bystanders, and others who
may come in contact with the product, as in the case of employ-
ees of the retailer, or a passer-by injured by an exploding bottle,
or a pedestrian hit by an automobile, have been denied recovery.
There may be no essential reason why such plaintiffs should not
be brought within the scope of the protection afforded, other than
that they do not have the same reasons for expecting such pro-
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tection as the consumer who buys a marketed product; but the
social pressure which has been largely responsible for the develop-
ment of the rule stated has been a consumers' pressure, and there
is not the same demand for the protection of casual strangers.
The Institute expresses neither approvral nor disapproval of ex-
pansion of the rule to permit recovery by such persons.
p. Further processing or substantial change. Thus far the
decisions applying the rule stated have not gone beyond products
which are sold in the condition, or in substantially the same con-
dition, in which they are expected to reach the hands of the
ultimate user or consumer. In the absence of decisions providing
a clue to the rules which are likely to develop, the Institute has
refrained from taking any position as to the possible liability
of the seller where the product is expected to, and does, undergo
further processing or other substantial change after it leaves
his hands and before it reaches those of the ultimate user or
consumer.
It seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the product
is to undergo processing, or other substantial change, will not in
all cases relieve the seller of liability under the rule stated in this
Section. If, for example, raw coffee beans are sold to a buyer
who roasts and packs them for sale to the ultimate consumer,
it cannot be supposed that the seller will be relieved of all liability
when the raw beans are contaminated with arsenic, or some other
poison. Likewise the seller of an automobile with a defective
steering gear which breaks and injures the driver, can scarcely
expect to be relieved of the responsibility by reason of the fact
that the car is sold to a dealer who is expected to "service" it,
adjust the brakes, mount and inflate the tires, and the like, before
it is ready for use. On the other hand, the manufacturer of
pigiron, which is capable of a wide variety of uses, is not so
likely to be held to strict liability when it turns out to be unsuit-
able for the child's tricycle into which it is finally made by a
remote buyer. The question is essentially one of whether the
responsibility for discovery and prevention of the dangerous de-
fect is shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the
changes. No doubt there will be some situations, and some de-
fects, as to which the responsibility will be shifted, and others in
which it will not. The existing decisions as yet throw no light
upon the questions, and the Institute therefore expresses neither
approval nor disapproval of the seller's strict liability in such a
case.
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q. Component parts. The same problem arises in cases of
the sale of a component part of a product to be assembled by
another, as for example a tire to be placed on a new automobile,
a brake cylinder for the same purpose, or an instrument for the
panel of an airplane. Again the question arises, whether the
responsibility is not shifted to the assembler. It is no doubt to
be expected that where there is no change in the component part
itself, but it is merely incorporated into something larger, the
strict liability will be found to carry* through to the ultimate user
or consumer. But in the absence of a sufficient number of deci-
sions on the matter to justify a conclusion, the Institute expresses
no opinion on the matter.
